You know that little A/B testing snippet marketing asked the dev team to paste into the site header three years ago? The one nobody has looked at since? On November 16, that snippet became the front door for one of the nastiest supply-chain attacks I’ve seen this year. The Optimizely hack pushed malicious JavaScript, signed and served straight from cdn.optimizely.com, onto 178 organisations’ websites. CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, Fox News, HSBC, IKEA, GitLab, Air France-KLM, Equifax, even Ledger. Yes, the crypto hardware wallet people.
And it ran for about 17 hours before anyone pulled the plug.
How the Optimizely hack worked
Optimizely sells website experimentation tools. To use them, customers load a JavaScript file from Optimizely’s CDN on every single page, and that file mixes Optimizely’s own code with a “Project JavaScript” field each customer can fill in. Somebody found a way to write into that field on other people’s projects. Optimizely has only said the bug sat in the sign-up flow for its Experimentation accounts, which is a strange place for a vulnerability that ends with write access to the BBC’s production script. They say it’s fixed. They haven’t said how it happened.
The injected code itself was tiny, just a loader. It fetched the real payload, a file called track.js, from a domain registered in the .cc space, with fallbacks: a base64-obfuscated URL, and a full inline copy in case your ad blocker killed the attacker’s domain. Report URI, who did most of the forensics, counted 26 rebuilds of that script during the day. Someone was at the keyboard, iterating.
It’s the same lesson as the Bitly link hijacking mess from last week, only with far sharper teeth: anything you embed and forget about is a liability with a countdown timer.
Card skimmer, crypto swapper, iPhone exploits
The payload was a buffet. First, a cryptocurrency clipper that swapped wallet addresses on eight networks (Bitcoin, Ethereum and friends, TRON, Solana, TON, Litecoin, Bitcoin Cash, Dogecoin) in page text, form fields, the clipboard, network requests and the share sheet. Within about ten hours the attacker’s wallets had collected roughly $7,040. Not a fortune, but remember this ran on Ledger’s site. The irony writes itself.
Second, a classic Magecart-style skimmer that watched form submissions for card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs, and posted them to a card.php endpoint. Fields hosted in Stripe or Adyen iframes were out of reach, which is a decent argument for never building your own checkout form. Third, it grabbed cookies without the HttpOnly flag and took screenshots. And fourth, as Ars Technica reported, iPhone and iPad visitors got served the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits, chosen by iOS version. Patched devices (iOS 18.7.3 and 26.3) were safe. Everyone else, well.
Of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets Report URI examined, 188 were infected, mostly in banking, finance and tech. Those are exactly the sites where you type card numbers. That wasn’t luck.
What you should do now
If you bought anything online on November 16, keep an eye on your statements for a few weeks. If you moved crypto that day, double-check the destination address actually landed where you meant it to. If you run a site with the Optimizely snippet, audit your Project JavaScript, rotate your credentials and assume any card entered through your own forms that day is burned.
Then take the bigger step. Every third-party script on your pages runs with the same powers as your own code. Subresource Integrity won’t help here because the file is supposed to change, but a Content Security Policy that locks down where scripts can connect would have blocked the loader from phoning home. We saw a similar blind spot with the backdoored Claude Code extension: trusted channel, poisoned content. And the clipper trick is the same one that’s been draining wallets since long before the Binance hack made headlines.
Optimizely’s incident page, at the time I’m writing this, says very little. 178 of the world’s biggest brands deserve better than “we fixed the sign-up flow”.
One forgotten snippet, a billion page views, 17 hours. That’s the whole modern web in a sentence.
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